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#threatdetection

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Good day everyone!

An APT group known as Angry Likho (a.k.a. Sticky Werewolf) is being monitored by Kaspersky's Securelist researchers and they have identified hundreds of victims of a recent attack in Russia, several in Belarus, and additional incidents in other countries. They used an age-old technique of spear-phishing to gain initial access that had various attachments that would contain the legitimate bait file as well as other files, in some cases malicious LNK files. Execution would lead to a newly discovered implant named FrameworkSurvivor.exe.

As usual, check out all the juicy details that I left out and enjoy the read! Happy Hunting!

Angry Likho: Old beasts in a new forest
securelist.com/angry-likho-apt

Intel 471 Cyborg Security, Now Part of Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting #readoftheday

Kaspersky · Angry Likho: Old beasts in a new forestBy Kaspersky

Good day everyone!

Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs discovered a new variant of the #Snake keylogger, a.k.a. "404 Keylogger". According to the report most of the detections from their "FortiSandbox" have come from China, Turkey, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Spain but if you aren't from these countries, you still may be a target!

Behaviors (MITRE ATT&CK):
Persistence - TA0003:
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - After the malware is executed and drops a copy of itself in the %Local_AppData%\supergroup directory then copies itself the the %Startup% folder.

Defense Evasion - TA0005:
Process Injection: Process Hollowing T1055.012 - The malware injects itself into a legitimate .NET process, in this sample it was RegSvcs.exe. This allowed it to run within a trusted process to evade detection.

Command And Control - TA0011:
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols - T1071.001
Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols - T1071.003

The malware used multiple techniques to upload stolen credentials. The researchers observed SMTP, Telegram bots, and HTTP Post requests to transmit the data.

As usual, go check out the research for yourself to check out the details that I left out and support the good work! Enjoy and Happy Hunting!

FortiSandbox 5.0 Detects Evolving Snake Keylogger Variant
fortinet.com/blog/threat-resea

Intel 471 Cyborg Security, Now Part of Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting #readoftheday

Fortinet Blog · FortiSandbox 5.0 Detects Evolving Snake Keylogger Variant | FortiGuard LabsExplore how FortiSandbox 5.0 detected this malware, the behavioral indicators it leveraged for identification, and Snake Keylogger's technique to evade detection and analysis.…

Good day everyone, new Blizzard has dropped!

Microsoft's Threat Intelligence shares their research on a Russian state actor dubbed #SeashellBlizzard! Part of the GRU, they specialize in operations from espionage to information operation and cyber-enabled disruptions which have resulted in destructive attacks and manipulation of ICS. They have leveraged different types of malware to include #KillDisk, #FoxBlade, and #NotPetya.

Behavior Summary (With MITRE ATT&CK):
Initial Access - TA0001:
Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190
Seashell Blizzard commonly exploited vulnerable public facing infrastructure.

Persistence - TA0003:
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service - T1543.003 -
Among other means of persistence, Seashell Blizzard created a system service.

Execution - TA0002:
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell - T1059.001
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell - T1059.003
Seashell Blizzard abused both of these living off the land binaries for multiple reasons and using multiple different parameters.

As always, there is WAAAAY too many technical details here, so go check it out yourself! Enjoy the read and Happy Hunting!

The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation
microsoft.com/en-us/security/b

Intel 471 Cyborg Security, Now Part of Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting #readoftheday

Microsoft Security Blog · The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security BlogMicrosoft is publishing for the first time our research into a subgroup within the Russian state actor Seashell Blizzard and its multiyear initial access operation, tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence as the “BadPilot campaign”. This subgroup has conducted globally diverse compromises of Internet-facing infrastructure to enable Seashell Blizzard to persist on high-value targets and support tailored network operations.

🚀 Kunai pushes further integration with MISP!

This week, we've made significant progress in bridging Kunai with @misp to enhance threat intelligence sharing. Our focus has been on developing kunai-to-misp, a new tool available at github.com/kunai-project/pykun, which processes Kunai logs and creates MISP events to streamline collaboration.

With this, it is now possible to both update MISP from Kunai and feed Kunai from MISP using the misp-to-kunai tool. Here's a practical workflow example:

1️⃣ Analyze a #linux malware sample with Kunai Sandbox (github.com/kunai-project/sandb)
2️⃣ Use kunai-to-misp on the collected Kunai logs
3️⃣ (Optional) Review attributes' IDS flag to maximize detections and reduce false positives
4️⃣ Use misp-to-kunai to distribute the results across all Kunai endpoints

Additionally, we're leveraging MISP’s data model to craft meaningful MISP objects and relationships, offering a clear visual representation of events inside MISP.

🔗 Try it out and let us know what you think!

AI/LLMs in the Service of Criminals 👾

As we witness the evolution of adversarial AI techniques, one of the most concerning developments is the use of large language models (LLMs) to obfuscate malicious JavaScript code.

More details: unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/us

Unit 42 · Now You See Me, Now You Don’t: Using LLMs to Obfuscate Malicious JavaScriptBy Lucas Hu

Corelight’s NOC team faced a unique challenge at Black Hat USA 2024—detecting SSHAMBLE, a new SSH scanner introduced by HD Moore. By tapping into existing logs and Zeek metadata, we identified the tool’s fingerprint in real-time.

What happened next?
✔️ Real-time detection.
✔️ Discovering threats using old logs. ✅✅
✔️ Zeek metadata making sense of encrypted traffic. 🔍

🔗 Head to the blog to learn more: corelight.com/blog/black-hat-u

Good day everyone!

Ryan R. at Intezer shares with us their work analyzing the #BabbleLoader, which is an "extremely evasive loader, packed with defensive mechanisms that is designed to bypass antivirus and sandbox environments to deliver stealers into memory".

There is a TON of analysis and intel here, so I am going to try and highlight the parts that I find significant and actionable!

Defense Evasion:
- The malware checks the installed graphics adapters to see if it is running in a sandboxed environment or not. This leverages the dxgi.dll which is the DirectX Graphics Infrastructure library.
- It checks the amount of unique running processes in the machine by calling NtQuerySystemInformation. The magic number is 85 unique processes with the assumption that a true infected computer would have more running processes that a sandbox would.

Next Stage:
- The next stage involves a Donut loader which, according the the GitHub README states: "Donut is a position-independent code that enables in-memory execution of VBScript, JScript, EXE, DLL files and dotNET assemblies.[1]"
- The ultimate payload in these examples were WhiteSnake and Meduza Stealers.

Hunt opportunity:
In this case, because the Donut loader and other payloads involved use command and control as their communication, there is an opportunity to run an unstructured hunt for "new" or anomalous connections. The article also mentioned that the WhiteSnake stealer uses the TOR network for C2 which would involve the installation on the victim's machine, which is another opportunity to find something suspicious.

Well, I am SURE there is plenty of information that is critical to everyone else BUT that is why it is time for you to read it for yourself! Enjoy and Happy Hunting!

Babble Babble Babble Babble Babble Babble BabbleLoader
intezer.com/blog/research/babb

Supplemental [1]:
GitHub/TheWover/Donut
github.com/TheWover/donut

Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting #readoftheday Cyborg Security, Now Part of Intel 471

Intezer · Babble Babble Babble Babble Babble Babble BabbleLoaderBabbleLoader: the annoyingly clever malware loader that jumbles, scrambles, and evades its way past modern defenses with frustrating ease.

Happy Friday everyone!

A Joint Advisory from the National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cyber National Mission Force, and the National Cyber Security Centre provides updates on the Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service, or #SVR.

According to the advisory, #APT29 (a.k.a Midnight Blizzard, Cozy Bear, and the Dukes) has targeted the defense, technology, and finance sectors to collect foreign intelligence and enable future cyber operations. They aim to exploit software vulnerabilities for initial access and escalate privileges. They also utilize spearphishing campaigns, password spraying, abuse of supply chain and trusted relationships. They also utilize custom malware and living-off-the-land (LOLBINs) techniques for multiple techniques.

The report includes a list of #CVEs that APT29 has been observed exploiting and attach the vendor and product that are effected with details that describe the vulnerability along with a section of mitigations that your organization can take to increase your security posture.

If you are looking for behaviors that are attributed to APT29, look no further than the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix! This resource has collected historic #TTPs and behaviors and referenced them as well. So while you are working on hardening your environment you can also hunt for their activity as well! Enjoy and Happy Hunting!

Article Source:
Update on SVR Cyber Operations and Vulnerability Exploitation
ic3.gov/Media/News/2024/241010

Mitre source:
attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/

Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting #readoftheday #huntoftheday #gethunting Cyborg Security, Now Part of Intel 471

Happy Thursday everyone!

The Symantec Threat Hunter Team observed activity from the North Korean hashtag#Stonefly group (a.k.a. Andariel, hashtag#APT45, Silent Chollima, Onyx Sleet) and identified parts of their toolset which include the hashtag#Nukebot backdoor, batch files that modify the registry key that is responsible for controlling if credentials are in plaintext or not (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest), and a list of open-source tools.

There were multiple ways that the adversary gained persistence which included some techniques I've discussed before: creating a .lnk file in the startup directory, creating a service, modifying the registry keys that control or execute items on startup, and scheduled tasks. Which makes me bust out the old but gold Hunt Package that covers that! But enjoy the article and Happy Hunting!

Stonefly: Extortion Attacks Continue Against U.S. Targets
symantec-enterprise-blogs.secu

Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting $readoftheday

symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.comStonefly: Extortion Attacks Continue Against U.S. TargetsAttacks continue after indictment naming North Korean suspect.

Happy #DFIRDay!

The DFIR Report has released another detailed report that starts with #Nitrogen malware and ends with #BlackCat ransomware encrypting the files of the victim.

Something that really stood out about this attack was the Persistence technique that was observed. Now I am not going to hit you with the same "Run Registry Keys" and "Windows Startup directory" but it does involve scheduled tasks. And not just the existence of a scheduled task being created but MULTIPLE task creation attempts. Not only does the section highlight the "human element" that exists with cyber attacks, since there were multiple mistakes and typos, but makes you question how often this type of thing occurs in your environment. I know I stand a little outside of organizations and I only have a small window in, but I think that this many attempts from a single or multiple hosts seems like a red flag. In other words, don't just think about the technique, think about frequency and how often this might legitimately exist. Once you understand that, it is easier to find the abnormal! Enjoy the rest of the article and Happy Hunting!

Nitrogen Campaign Drops Sliver and Ends With BlackCat Ransomware
thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/n

Intel 471 #ThreatIntel #ThreatHunting #ThreatDetection #HappyHunting #readoftheday Cyborg Security, Now Part of Intel 471

🔔 For those wondering how to gain visibility on their #Linux system for #ThreatDetection and #ThreatHunting:

Check out the Kunai Project! It's completely free and supports IoC-based detection, Yara rules, custom detection rules, and more.

A new release is available: github.com/kunai-project/kunai

GitHubReleases · kunai-project/kunaiThreat-hunting tool for Linux. Contribute to kunai-project/kunai development by creating an account on GitHub.